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At the Fourth Ministerial Meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Doha in
November 2001, members agreed to launch the next comprehensive round of
multilateral trade negotiations (MTNs). The attempt to do so at the previous Ministerial
in Seattle in late 1999 was aborted, not least because developing country members
believed they had not benefited sufficiently from the preceding Uruguay Round. That
belief still persists, and the poorer developing countries of South Asia and sub-Saharan
Africa (SSA) in particular remain sceptical that a new round of negotiations will benefit
them – notwithstanding the substantial focus on their development concerns in the Doha
Ministerial Declaration (WTO 2001b).
If the poorer developing countries of South Asia, SSA and elsewhere are to become
constructively engaged in this next attempt to liberalize trade multilaterally, they need
to be convinced that they will receive sufficient gains from trade reform to warrant the
inevitable costs of negotiation and adjustment. They and the donor community also
need to be convinced that trade reform will alleviate rather than add to poverty and food
insecurity in their countries. The net food-importing developing countries, and those
currently receiving tariff preferences or food aid, are especially worried that they will be
made worse off by agricultural trade reform.
This paper offers an economic assessment of the opportunities and challenges provided
by the Doha Development Agenda’s MTN round for low-income countries seeking to
trade their way out of poverty. After a brief discussion of the links between poverty,
economic growth and trade, it reports modelling results showing that farm product
markets remain the most costly of all goods market distortions in world trade. It then
focuses on what such reform might mean for countries of South Asia and SSA in
particular, both without and with their involvement in the MTN reform process. What
becomes clear from that comparison of modelling results is that if those countries want
to maximize their benefits from the Doha Development Agenda, they need also to free
up their own domestic product and factor markets so their farmers are better able to take
advantage of new market-opening opportunities abroad. The paper then addresses other
concerns of low-income countries about farm trade reform: whether there would be
losses associated with tariff preference erosion, whether food-importing countries would
suffer from higher food prices in international markets, whether China’s WTO
accession will provide an example of trade reform aggravating poverty via cuts to prices
received by Chinese farmers, and the impact on food security and poverty alleviation.
The paper concludes with lessons of relevance for low-income countries for their own
domestic and trade policies.
Links between poverty, economic growth and trade
Throughout most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the number of people in the
world in absolute poverty (defined as living on less than the equivalent of US$1 per day
in 1985 PPP terms) had been increasing almost continually (Bouguignon and Morrisson
2002). Since the late 1970s, however, the number has declined by more than 200
million, or from 15 to 7 per cent of the global population; and the number on less than
US$2 per day has declined by 450 million, or from 40 to 19 per cent of the world’s
people, according to new estimates by Sala-i-Martin (2002).2
Remarkable though that recent achievement has been in such a short period, Sala-i-
Martin’s data suggest there are still 350 million on less than US$1 and almost one
billion on less than US$2 per day – most of whom are in Asia and SSA.1 Since poverty
alleviation for those remaining poor people is a high priority, efforts have been made to
understand the reasons behind successful alleviation. The evidence presented by Sala-i-
Martin suggests economic growth differences have been largely responsible for the
differences in poverty alleviation across regions, a finding supported by numerous other
studies (for example, Dollar and Kraay 2002). Initiatives that boost national economic
growth rates are therefore likely to be helpful in the fight against poverty, ceteris
paribus.
Trade liberalization is one such initiative that tends to boost economic growth.2 But it
also alters relative prices, so its net effect on poverty reduction depends also on the
signs of those relative product and factor price changes. If the price changes are pro-
poor, then they will reinforce any positive growth effects of trade reform on the poor.
Potential gains from the WTO’s Doha Development Agenda
Tariffs facing poor-country exports to other markets are high. At the end of the Uruguay
Round negotiations, the tariff equivalent of import market access barriers to goods trade
were low for minerals and energy raw materials and for most manufactures entering
developed country markets (the exceptions being textiles and clothing); but they were
high for numerous manufactures entering developing country markets and even higher
for agricultural goods entering both rich and poor countries (Table 1). Since developing
countries’ interests in market access opportunities abroad are primarily in either farm
products and/or light manufactures such as textiles and clothing – goods that are the
most protected in world trade (see also WTO 2001a) – they have a great deal to gain
potentially from the Doha Round.
That fact is reflected in a recent set of empirical estimates using a model of the global
economy known as GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project), which is an applied general
equilibrium model based in Purdue University (Hertel 1997).3 According to estimates in
Anderson (2003), of all the economic gains to be had in 2005 from removing the
                                                
1 World Bank estimates (for example, Collier and Dollar 2002, Figure 3) also indicate a decline in the
number of poor, but they suggest those numbers on less than US$1 per day are several times larger,
possibly as many as 1.2 billion in 2000.
2 The link between openness and economic growth, while not completely unambiguous and universal,
is strong, and there is no evidence that openness is harmful to growth (see the discussion in
McCulloch et al. 2001, Chapter 2). Trade’s impact on growth can be much reduced in the absence of
liberal domestic markets, macro stability, and appropriate institutions and infrastructure, however,
since those are all necessary to enable producers to respond to changes in international market signals
(Hoekman et al. 2002). For a comprehensive survey of the links between trade, growth and poverty,
see Berg and Krueger (2002). A survey of the empirical evidence is available in Winters et al. (2002).
3 The GTAP model is a standard, multi-region model that is currently in use by several hundred
researchers in scores of countries on five continents. The Version 4 data base builds on contributions
from many of these individuals, as well as the national and international agencies in the GTAP
Consortium.3
Table 1
Average tariff equivalents of import market access barriers to goods trade, by source and
destination region, 1995 (per cent)
Importing region
Exporting region High income Low income World
Agriculture
High income 16 22 18
Low income 15 18 16
World 16 20 17
Manufactures
High income 1 11 4
Low income 3 13 7
World 2 12 5
Minerals/energy
High income 0.1 1.3 0.4
Low income 0.4 5.2 2.4
World 0.2 3.0 1.1
Source: Hertel et al. (1999).
barriers to trade in goods that will still be in place after all Uruguay Round
commitments are implemented, almost half (48 per cent) would come from agricultural
and processed food policy reform in OECD countries (Table 2) – even though such
products in those countries contribute only 4 per cent of global GDP and less than one-
tenth of world trade. Another one-sixth of the welfare gains would come from reform of
farm and food policies of developing countries.
Textiles and clothing reforms would be the next biggest contributor, although they
appear small by comparison with agricultural reform: their potential global welfare
contribution is only one-ninth that of agriculture’s (7 per cent compared with 65 per
cent). This big difference reflects two facts: one is that projected distortions to prices for
agriculture are more than twice those for textiles and clothing in 2005; the other is that
textiles and clothing contribute only 1.5 per cent to the value of world production and 5
per cent to the value of world trade, half or less the shares for farm products (Anderson
2003).
Two assumptions are crucial in generating the results reported in Table 2, however. One
is that China and Taiwan, having joined the WTO at the end of 2001/start of 2002,
enjoy the same accelerated access to OECD markets under the Uruguay Round
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) as other developing countries that were
already WTO members. The other crucial assumption is that OECD countries fully
implement the spirit of the ATC by the end of 2004, that is, they remove remaining
import quotas and do not replace them with similarly protective instruments such as
safeguard measures. Dropping either of those assumptions reduces very substantially
the estimated gains from Uruguay Round implementation (Anderson et al. 1997b), and
therefore would raise the potential gains from textile and clothing reform in the next and
subsequent WTO rounds above that reflected in Table 2.4
Table 2
Sectoral and regional contributions to economic welfare gains
a from completely removing trade
barriers globally, post-Uruguay Round, 2005
















High income 110.5 -0.0 -5.7 -8.1 96.6
Low income 11.6 0.1 9.0 22.3 43.1
Total 122.1 0.0 3.3 14.2 139.7
Low income
High income 11.2 0.2 10.5 27.7 49.6
Low income 31.4 2.5 3.6 27.6 65.1
Total 42.6 2.7 14.1 55.3 114.7
All countries
High income 121.7 0.1 4.8 19.6 146.2
Low income 43.0 2.7 12.6 49.9 108.1
Total 164.7 2.8 17.4 69.5 254.3














High income 43.4 0.0 -2.3 -3.2 38.0
Low income 4.6 0.1 3.5 8.8 16.9
Total 48.0 0.0 1.3 5.6 54.9
Low income
High income 4.4 0.1 4.1 10.9 19.5
Low income 12.3 1.0 1.4 10.9 25.6
Total 16.7 1.1 5.5 21.7 45.1
All countries
High income 47.9 0.1 1.9 7.7 57.5
Low income 16.9 1.0 4.9 19.6 42.5
Total 64.8 1.1 6.8 27.3 100.0
Notes:
a No account is taken in these calculations of the welfare effects of environmental changes associated with
trade liberalization, which could be positive or negative depending in part on how environmental
policies are adjusted following trade reforms.
b
 High and low income here are short-hand for developed and developing countries.
Source: Anderson (2003).
The distribution of the gains across regions that would result from full trade
liberalization is clear from the upper half of Table 2. As always, most of the gains
accrue to the liberalizing region. For example, all but one-tenth (12/122) of the gains5
from high-income countries removing distortions to their trade in farm and food
products accrues to those countries. Even so, that farm trade reform contributes more
than one-quarter of the total welfare gains to developing countries from rich countries
liberalizing their merchandise trade (12/43). That is more than the contribution of rich
countries’ barriers to textile and clothing trade (9/43), and over half the contribution of
all other manufacturing trade barriers. As for developing countries liberalizing their own
farm and food policies, three-quarters of the benefits therefrom stay with the developing
countries themselves (31/43), and those policies contribute almost half of the gains from
those countries’ overall merchandise trade reform (31/65).
WTO members were right, therefore, to insist that agricultural reform must continue
into the new century without a pause. In particular, developing countries as a group
have a major stake in the process of farm policy reform continuing: according to the
model results in Table 2, farm and food policies globally contribute 40 per cent (43/108)
of the cost to developing economies of global goods trade distortions. Textile and
clothing policies also harm them greatly, but barely one-third as much as farm policies.4
The Table shows that 60 per cent of the contribution to developing countries from trade
liberalization – and 72 per cent of that from farm trade liberalization – would come
from reforms by developing countries themselves.5
The above GTAP modeling study found that full liberalization of rich-country farm
policies would boost the volume of global agricultural trade by more than 50 per cent,
but would cause real international food prices to rise by only 5 per cent on average. For
the subset of low-income countries that would remain net food-importing economies
after such a reform and thereby suffer a deterioration in its terms of trade, the extent of
the rise in their food import prices would be small.
The results for developing countries in Table 2 are disaggregated in Table 3 to show the
effects on subgroups of developing countries. In dollar terms the gains from global
liberalization would be almost as great for Southeast Asia as for South Asia, while less
than half as large for the much smaller economic region of SSA. Being more agrarian,
SSA would gain proportionately more than Asia from agricultural trade reform by either
rich or poor countries. Virtually all regions are net gainers from complete abolition of
trade barriers: even though some of them suffer a terms of trade deterioration, that cost
is more than offset by improved efficiency of domestic resource use following reform.
                                                
4 It should be recognized that these results ignore the effect of tariff preference erosion. In so far as a
developing country receives such preferences at present in OECD markets, the above results slightly
overstate the potential gains from their reforms. This point is taken up below.
5 Martin (2001) points out that since the mid-1980s, the share of developing countries’ agricultural
exports that are going to other developing countries has risen from less than 30 per cent to more than
40 per cent.6
Table 3
Disaggregation of sectoral and regional contributions to economic welfare gains from completely
removing trade barriers globally, post-Uruguay Round, 2005 (1995 US$ billion)
Rich country liberalization Developing country liberalization Global liberalization
Total Agric. Manuf. Total Agric. Manuf. All merchandise
US$ US$ US$ US$ US$ US$ US$ % of GDP
North America 2.57 11.37 -8.80 19.41 8.51 10.91 21.99 0.2
Western Europe 50.29 60.81 -10.52 20.68 2.02 18.66 70.97 0.7
Australia/New Zealand 7.69 8.25 -0.55 1.83 1.23 0.60 9.53 2.0
Japan 36.02 29.98 6.04 7.69 -0.33 8.02 43.71 0.8
China 5.01 -4.63 9.64 -10.79 -3.60 -7.19 -5.78 -0.4
Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan 3.97 0.77 6.09 24.09 11.97 12.12 28.06 2.3
Indonesia 0.63 0.16 0.47 1.38 0.22 1.16 2.00 0.9
Other Southeast Asia 0.43 -0.90 1.33 10.25 5.67 4.59 10.69 2.6
India 3.69 0.68 3.01 5.14 1.90 3.24 8.83 1.8
Other South Asia 1.37 0.12 1.25 5.22 3.02 2.20 6.59 4.6
Brazil 3.11 1.44 1.67 13.29 4.59 8.71 16.41 2.0
Other Latin America 14.83 14.25 0.57 4.47 2.75 1.73 19.30 2.4
Turkey 0.12 -0.59 0.71 1.94 0.60 1.33 2.05 0.9
Middle East & N. Africa -1.07 -2.81 1.74 -0.71 -0.35 -0.36 -1.78 -0.2
Economies in Transition 4.49 1.21 3.28 1.90 2.30 -0.40 6.40 0.7
South African CU 0.86 0.76 0.10 0.51 0.38 0.13 1.36 0.9
Other SSA 1.72 1.58 0.14 1.49 1.23 0.27 3.22 1.4
Rest of world 3.92 2.62 1.30 6.87 3.24 3.63 10.79 3.0
Low income 43.08 11.77 31.31 65.06 33.90 31.17 108.14 1.9
High income 96.58 110.41 -13.83 49.61 11.43 38.18 146.19 0.6
Total 139.65 122.18 17.48 114.68 45.33 69.35 254.33 0.8
Source: Anderson (2003).
The final two columns of Table 3 reveal that, even though developing countries would
gain slightly less than rich countries in aggregate dollar terms from a move to global
free trade in merchandise, they gain much more as a percentage of GDP: 1.9 per cent,
which is more than three times the percentage for rich countries. For SSA (other than
South African Customs Union – SACU) the gain would be 1.4 per cent of its GDP.
Furthermore, those developing countries would gain less if they abstained from
reforming their own policies. To illustrate the point, the effects on low-income countries
in SSA and South Asia are examined first without and then with those economies
participating in reform (drawing on more-recent results reported in Anderson and Yao
2003). If all regions other than South Asia and SSA were to remove their trade
distortions remaining after the end of 2004 (when all Uruguay Round commitments are
to have been implemented), the world economy would structurally adjust to allow each
region to exploit even more its comparative advantages. Sub-Saharan Africa and South
Asia would have to undertake some structural changes within and between key sectors
even if they chose not to join in such a trade reform (Table 4(a)). In particular,7
Table 4
Percentage difference in sectoral output when all merchandise trade distortions remaining post-
Uruguay Round are removed, 2005
(a) Reform in all regions except SSA and South Asia
South Africa Other SSA India
Other South
Asia
Rice 6 1 12 9
Wheat 18 2 6 6
Other cereal grain 114 85 1 1
Vegetables, fruit, nuts 1 0 1 1
Oil seeds 2 3 -1 2
Other crops 43 -8 -2 1
Plant fibre -12 11 -2 0
Livestocks 28 15 0 1
Other food products 28 2 -2 29
Meat and dairy products 38 14 1 3
Forestry fish 2 0 0 1
Energy mineral -2 0 1 2
Vegetable oils fats 0 0 -4 -5
Textile wap -8 -2 -10 -16
Other manufactures -7 0 3 11
Services 0 0 0 0
(b) Reform in all regions including SSA and South Asia
South Africa Other SSA India
Other South
Asia
Rice 4 -1 19 18
Wheat -3 -6 15 7
Other cereal grain 171 90 1 2
Vegetables, fruit, nuts 1 9 0 -3
Oil seeds -5 -1 0 7
Other crops 61 9 -2 -4
Plant fibre -10 -1 -2 -1
Livestocks -6 54 0 6
Other food products 22 3 1 38
Meat and dairy products -6 0 2 8
Forestry fish 7 4 0 3
Energy mineral 29 76 3
Vegetable oils fats 0 2 -15 -17
Textile wap 1 -13 5 29
Other manufactures -8 -5 19 60
Services 1 0 2 4
Source: Anderson and Yao (2003).8
agriculture would expand at the expense of labour-intensive manufacturing in those
low-income countries. However, SSA would expand its agricultural output more, and
contract its manufacturing more, if it also undertakes reforms itself than if it stands
aside from reform. The trade balance for the different product groups is affected by the
above production effects plus changes in consumption, following relative price and
income changes. By comparing Tables 5(a) and 5(b) it is evident that net food imports
are less for SSA and South Asia following the removal of remaining trade barriers in
2005, but more so when those developing countries participate in the reform.
The results in Anderson and Yao (2003) suggest SSA’s economic welfare gain is twice
as great from participating in than from standing aside from further trade liberalization.
However, most of that greater gain goes to the SACU. The reason that ‘Other SSA’ as
an aggregate does not gain more is that the very considerable gains from more efficient
resource use there would be offset by an adverse change in the region’s terms of trade
when all of those countries expand their primary product exports simultaneously.
That finding raises the question: would the economy of each SSA country be better off
if its government did not participate in the next WTO round? The answer is: certainly
not. On the contrary, their economy’s welfare would be even worse if their government
did not participate, for several reasons. One is that it would forego the economic
efficiency gains from reforming its own policies while still suffering the terms of trade
loss from others’ reforms (since any one of those countries is too small for its own
policy choice to alter the terms of trade significantly).6 Second, it would forego the
opportunity to seek through the negotiations greater market access for its particular
exports to other countries. And third, there is the promise in this next round that any
participating poor economies that lose from taking part in the multilateral liberalization
could secure much more compensation than in previous rounds, in the form of technical
assistance and funds for trade policy capacity building (WTO 2001b).
It is thus in the national economic interest of such countries to be pressured from abroad
to commit to such reform, painful though that may be politically for its government. The
political pain tends to be less, and the prospect for a net economic gain greater, the more
sectors the country involves in the reform. The economic gain is prospectively greater
the more sectors it involves because a wider net reduces the possibility that reform is
confined to a subset of sectors that are not the most distorted. (When so confined,
resources might move from the reformed sector to even more inefficient uses, thereby
reducing rather than improving the efficiency of national resource use.)
If these were not enough reasons for national governments in SSA to become active
participants in the Doha Round, including embracing trade reform at home, there are at
least three other reasons for doing so. One is that the more each country is prepared to
provide trading partners with greater access to its own market, the more those partners
are willing to reciprocate by providing greater access to their markets. That benefits
exporters in all countries, offsetting the loss of domestic political support from import-
competing producers. The second reason is that once a country binds its reform
                                                
6 For empirical support for this proposition, see for example Anderson and Strutt (1999) with respect to
Indonesia. The point is made strongly also in the volume on the Uruguay Round edited by Martin and
Winters (1996).9
Table 5
Changes in sectoral trade balances when all merchandise trade distortions remaining post-
Uruguay Round are removed, 2005 (1995 US$ billion)
(a)  Reform in all regions except SSA and South Asia
South
Africa Other SSA India
Other South
Asia
Rice -54 28 1,897 397
Wheat -50 44 671 48
Other cereal grain 1,016 1,815 50 1
Vegetables, fruit, nuts -114 -8 67 -17
Oil seeds -79 48 119 39
Other crops 2,427 -2,068 28 -108
Plant fibre -106 589 30 -70
Livestocks 21 365 6 4
Other food products 5,062 339 -494 3,232
Meat and dairy products 2,954 569 153 130
Forestry fish -4 -54 0 -25
Energy mineral -436 -198 185 -297
Vegetable oils fats -145 -22 -186 -70
Textile wap -498 -143 -7,159 -6,315
OtherManufactures -8,066 -469 4,552 3,484
Services -1,927 -836 80 -433
(b) Reform in all regions including SSA and South Asia
South
Africa Other SSA India
Other South
Asia
Rice -82 -54 2,565 689
Wheat -152 -252 1,736 163
Other cereal grain 1,681 1,911 67 0
Vegetables, fruit nuts -66 881 -118 -590
Oil seeds -62 68 224 -175
Other crops 3,609 1,704 -647 -2,001
Plant fibre -73 158 -244 -782
Livestocks 73 1,146 -3 7
Other food products 4,976 230 195 3,530
Meat and dairy products -480 -239 458 36
Forestry fish 29 270 -234 -148
Energy mineral 6,760 4,442 -410 -3,381
Vegetable oils fats -125 -46 -1,292 -585
Textile wap -605 -1,490 629 3,706
Other manufactures -14,086 -8,054 -5,068 1,698
Services -1,398 -676 2,142 -2,168
Source: Anderson and Yao (2003).
commitments, as required under WTO, its government is better able to resist the
temptation to give in to political pressure to reverse that reform. And the third reason10
has to do with the spread of globalization, which is raising the net political benefits of
opening up markets versus remaining protectionist and interventionist. The dramatic
falls in the costs of doing business across national boundaries mean not only that the
rewards from opening one’s own economy to foreign trade and investment flows have
risen, but also that the costs of not  adopting and maintaining an open, stable and
transparent set of economic policies also are rising. If, as a result of these globalization
forces, the governments of developing economies choose to embrace more reform at
home, it makes sense to capitalize on that decision by using the next WTO Round to
demand greater access to trading partners’ markets in return.
Qualifications to the global modeling results
There are three other important source of gains from trade reform that are not captured
in the above results, namely, gains from reform to trade in services, gains from
increasing competition and economies of scale, and dynamic gains. They are discussed
in turn below. Then the next section addresses the question of whether it matters that
global trade liberalization erodes poor countries’ tariff preferences.
The nature of service sector policies makes estimating their effects much more difficult
than is the case for goods barriers to trade. Nonetheless, preliminary empirical attempts
suggest restrictions on services trade and investment flows are very substantial,
particularly by developing countries (Findlay and Warren 2000). Moreover, the GATS
negotiations during the Uruguay Round resulted in almost no commitments to lowering
those impediments (Hoekman 1996). During that Round many developing countries
considered the negotiations that led to the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS) as something they had to put up with in order to get agriculture and textiles
‘concessions’. Yet the gains to developing countries from opening up their services
markets, as for developed countries, would be enormous. Those gains would come not
just directly to consumers but also to producers who purchase services as intermediate
inputs into their goods production. Farmers in particular would benefit from services
reform because they depend heavily on such things as transport services to get their
produce to domestic and overseas markets (Anderson and Hoekman 2000).
Other attempts at measuring distortions to services trade together with mark-ups by
imperfectly competitive firms also are beginning to bear fruit. A study by Francois
(2001) includes one set of estimates of the tariff equivalent of those distortions in a
version of the GTAP model that also incorporates imperfect competition and scale
economies. Specifically, that study assumes monopolistic competition exists in the non-
primary sectors involving economies of scale that are internal to each firm. These
modifications amplify the estimated gains from trade considerably. For example, that
study finds that if applied tariff rates for both goods and services were to be cut in half,
the global gains would be US$385 billion, of which 51 per cent would be due to
services reform. The 49 per cent due to halving tariffs on goods trade (US$192 billion)
in the Francois study compares with the above estimate (where no imperfect
competition is assumed) of around US$250 billion from totally removing all tariffs on
merchandise trade. The key point to draw from this comparison is that the gains from
trade reported above should be interpreted as lower-bound estimates for at least two
reasons: because they apply only to goods trade, leaving aside the important distortions11
prevalent in services markets; and because they are based on the assumption that there
are no economies of scale and that perfect competition prevails in all sectors.
Both aspects of this point are especially important for SSA. With respect to policies at
home they are important partly because that region has among the highest barriers to
services trade (Francois 2001, Table C.2), and partly because the region’s national
economies are small and hence those services trade barriers translate into a high degree
of monopolistic activity and diseconomies of small scale.
With respect to policies abroad, this point is perhaps even more important for SSA,
especially as it applies to ocean shipping. Two-thirds of sub-Saharan African exports
are primary products. Most of them are being shipped in bulky unprocessed or semi-
processed form. The region’s export earnings are thus affected significantly by the cost
of ocean shipping services. That service sector is characterized by a high degree of
oligopolistic activity on the part of ship owners, virtually all of whom are developed
country firms. While ever that service sector remains restrictive, the benefits of freer
trade will be captured in part by the cartel of shipowners who can charge a higher mark-
up above their marginal costs as import tariffs on goods are lowered. To illustrate this, a
recent empirical study was undertaken by Francois and Wooten (2001). They estimate
that, depending on the degree of collusion, shippers could absorb for themselves, in the
form of higher mark-ups, up to half the gains that exporters would otherwise enjoy from
goods trade liberalization if only shipping was a competitive service activity. The clear
conclusion to draw from the Francois/Wooten study is that liberalizing trade in maritime
services under GATS is likely to boost substantially the gains from merchandise trade
reform and especially reform of bulky commodities such as agricultural products from
developing countries.
None of the studies reported above draw on a truly dynamic economic model. They
measure well the effects of producers reallocating their resources and consumers
adjusting their purchases when relative product prices change with trade reform, but
they do not measure the impact of such reform on investment behaviour. Yet we know
from experience that when markets are freed up, investors divert their funds towards
expanding the now-more-profitable activities and away from the now-less-profitable
ones. They are also willing to invest more in aggregate, because of the reduced
uncertainty associated with binding the reforms in WTO schedules. That boost to
investment applies even more following the reductions in barriers to foreign investment
and hence international technology transfers of the past two decades. Thus economic
growth is boosted by that diversion and expansion of investment funds, over and above
the boost in output from reallocating existing resource endowments.
This additional effect is omitted from most empirical modelling efforts for two reasons:
partly because it takes much longer for analysts to build and to run dynamic models
than comparative static ones, and partly because the extent to which investors respond
to changing incentives is less well understood and hence cannot be included with as
much certainty as the other behavioural characteristics that are common to both
comparative static and dynamic models. Keeping that in mind, it is nonetheless
instructive to note the results of a recent study that examined the range of outcomes
generated as the responsiveness of productivity to openness is varied.
The World Bank (2002, Chapter 6) conducted a study very similar to the one reported
above, and obtained very similar results when its version of the GTAP model was in12
comparative static mode (a global welfare gain from complete liberalization of
merchandise trade of US$355 billion per year by 2015, compared with the present
study’s estimate of US$254 billion as early as 2005 when the world economy would be
somewhat smaller, and with agricultural policies still responsible for about two-thirds of
that gain). When their same model was switched into dynamic mode, however, that
global gain increased two- to three-fold over reasonable ranges of productivity
responsiveness parameters. This adds further weight to the claim that the earlier welfare
results should be considered as very much lower-bound estimates of the gains from
trade liberalization.
In short, developing countries have much to gain economically from taking part in the
next round of WTO negotiations to liberalize trade, and more so the more they are
willing to embrace reform at home so as to enable their firms to take greatest advantage
of the opportunities provided by the opening up of markets abroad. And this applies
especially to agricultural trade reform.
Does it matter that global trade reform erodes tariff preferences?
In the past, many developing countries have put their negotiating efforts more into
seeking extensions of preferential trading schemes than into cuts to remaining most-
favoured-nation (MFN) barriers to trade in agricultural, textile or other products. That
first option is currently still before them in at least two forms: through some extensions
to tariff preferences to developing countries; and through expanding sub-regional free-
trade areas.
There are several types of preferential access schemes that have been designed to
mitigate the effects of high tariffs on exports from developing countries to advanced
economies. They range from very broad ones with minor tariff concessions, such as the
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), to market-specific ones such as the European
Union’s provision of duty free access for certain volumes of certain products from
certain developing countries (mostly former colonies of EU member states) in Africa,
the Caribbean and the Pacific (formerly the Lomé Convention, now the Cotonou
Agreement), to the new EU proposal for duty- and quota-free access for most exports
from the Least Developed Countries (LDCs, as classified by the United Nations). To
what extent are these arrangements stepping stones or stumbling blocks towards better
market access abroad for poor African countries? In particular, how effective are these
arrangements as compared with MFN liberalizations under the WTO in delivering
benefits to the poorer economies (as distinct from just being easier politically for
national governments to sign)?
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) developing countries that have been granted
preferential access to European Union markets for some of their exports typically
consider themselves privileged, believing that it better enables them to compete in those
markets. Not only do they not have to pay the same import duty as other foreign
suppliers, but also they receive the EU domestic price, which is higher than the
international price to the extent of the protection afforded by the tariff on non-ACP
imports.13
Beneficial though this might sound, such an assessment ignores four important points.
First, many other equally poor but non-ACP developing countries are harmed by the
ACP preferences. This was made abundantly clear in the 1990s during the infamous
dispute-settlement case that was brought to the WTO concerning the EU’s banana
import regime. One background study showed that for every dollar of benefit that the
banana policy brought to producers in ACP countries, the regime harmed non-ACP
developing country producers by almost exactly one dollar – and in the process harmed
EU consumers by more than thirteen dollars (Borrell 1999a). It is difficult to imagine a
more inefficient way of transferring welfare to poor countries, since EU citizens could
have, through direct payments, been thirteen times as effective in helping ACP banana
producers and not hurt non-ACP banana producers at all. Such wasteful trade diversion
is avoided under non-discriminatory, MFN liberalizations that result from multilateral
trade negotiations under WTO.
Second, the additional production that is encouraged in those ACP countries getting
privileged access to the high-priced EU market is not internationally competitive at
current prices (otherwise it would have been produced prior to getting that preferential
treatment). Indeed the industry as a whole may not have existed in the ACP country had
the preference scheme not been introduced.7 In that case, its profits are likely to be lean
despite the scheme, and would disappear if and when the scheme is dismantled. Efforts
to learn the skills needed, and the sunk capital invested in that industry rather than in
ones in which the country has a natural comparative advantage, would then earn no
further rewards.
Third, the ACP preferential access scheme under the Lomé Convention has not been a
reciprocal agreement, that is, the developing countries were not required to open their
markets to EU products. While that makes life easy for ACP politicians, it contributes
nothing to the removal of the wasteful trade-restrictive policies of the ACP countries.
This contrasts with market access negotiations under WTO, which are characterized by
reciprocity: you receive greater access to my markets (on an MFN basis) on the
condition that your trading partner receives a similar degree of improvement in access
to your markets.
Fourth and perhaps most importantly, the ACP preference scheme reduces very
substantially the capacity for developing countries as a group to press for more access to
EU markets. It does this in two ways: by reducing the number of such countries arguing
against protection, and by creating a subset of developing countries supporting the EU’s
protectionist stance (in order to continue to receive the high domestic prices in the EU
market). This point is crucial, and yet it is often not appreciated. Perhaps if these
preferences had not been offered in the first place, developing countries would have
negotiated much more vigorously in previous GATT rounds for lower tariffs on
agricultural and other imports into the EU. That in turn would have placed greater
pressure on Japan and others to reduce their agricultural protectionism also. The end
result would have been higher international prices for agricultural products that, for
developing country producers as a group, may have been more than sufficient to offset
the lower prices received in the EU market for a subset of those producers.
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extreme example of an industry that has ossified as a consequence of regulations introduced to share
the expected benefits of EU preferences is sugar in Mauritius (Borrell 1999b).14
A similar set of provisos can be made about the EU’s recent proposal to extend
preferences for UN-designated ‘least developed countries’ (LDCs). That initiative
would provide duty- and quota-free access to the EU for exports of all merchandise
except arms (Cernat et al. 2002). It received in-principle, best-endeavours endorsement
at the 3
rd WTO Ministerial in Doha in November 2001, but without any specific
timetable.8
Liberal though that proposal sounds, note that it does not include trade in services (of
which the most important for LDCs would be movement of natural persons, that is,
freedom for LDC labourers to work in the EU or other high-wage countries).9 Also, a
number of safeguard provisions are included in addition to the EU’s normal anti-
dumping measures. Furthermore, access to three politically sensitive agricultural
markets, bananas, rice and sugar, would be phased in by the EU only gradually over the
next eight years (and would be subject to stricter safeguards). Not surprisingly, it is
these three products, but especially sugar, that offer the greatest potential for growth in
trade from least developed countries to the EU (see Figure 4.1 of Cernat et al. 2002).
Several empirical studies of the proposal have already appeared. A World Bank study
by Ianchovichina et al. (2001) compares the EU proposal, from the viewpoint of SSA,
with recent initiatives of the United States and Japan. Their GTAP modelling results
suggest that even the most generous interpretation of the US’s Africa Growth and
Opportunity Act (which they model as unrestricted access to the US for all SSA
exports) would benefit SSA very little because the US economy is already very open
and, in the products where it is not (for example, textiles and clothing), SSA countries
have little comparative advantage. Likewise they find the Japanese proposal of free
access to Japan’s market for industrial products helps SSA hardly at all, since the region
exports few industrial products. By contrast, the EU proposal, especially if it were to
apply to all QUAD countries (the EU, the US, Canada and Japan), would have a
sizeable effect on SSA trade and welfare – provided agriculture is included in the deal.
Just from EU access alone, SSA exports would be raised by more than US$0.5 billion
and SSA economic welfare would increase by US$0.3 billion per year (a 0.2 per cent
boost). This is very similar to a recent estimate by UNCTAD/Commonwealth
Secretariat (2001, Chapter 3).
The estimated benefits are not surprising given that agriculture and food products
account for more than half SSA exports. These items are highly protected in the EU and
other QUAD countries, and little is provided for them in the way of preferential access
under the GSP. The results overstate the benefits of the EU proposal, however, as this
World Bank study assumes all SSA countries (excluding relatively wealthy South
Africa and Mauritius), not just the LDCs amongst them, would get duty- and quota-free
access.
Another World Bank study, by Hoekman et al. (2002), uses a partial equilibrium
approach and looks at the benefit of the EU initiative for LCDs not just in SSA but
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the objective of duty-free, quota-free market access for products originating from LDCs’.
9 On the potential gains from freeing international trade in unskilled labour services globally, see
Walmsley and Winters (2002).15
globally. It finds that trade of LDCs would increase by US$2.5 billion per year if all
QUAD countries provided them duty- and quota-free access on all merchandise.10
However, almost half of that increase would come as a result of trade diversion from
other developing countries. The authors suggest this is trivial because it represents less
than 0.1 per cent of other developing countries’ exports (about US$1.1 billion).11 That
misses a similar point to the one made above, however. It is that if the 48 LDCs are
given such preferences, they will become advocates for rather than against  the
continuation of MFN tariff peaks for agriculture and textiles – diminishing considerably
the number of WTO members negotiating for their reduction. It may be true that
reductions in agricultural and textile tariffs would help LDCs much less than it would
help other developing countries, as the study by Hoekman et al. (2002) finds; but the
gains to consumers in the QUAD would be more than sufficient to allow them to
increase their aid to LDCs to compensate for the loss of income from preference
erosion. To put the point in a blunter but more general way, trade can be worse than
direct aid if the trade is preferential and thereby distortionary.
Wouldn’t food-importing countries lose from higher international food prices?
Among the net food-importing developing countries, some fear agricultural protection
cuts by OECD countries will lead to higher international food prices for their imports.
Yet even those developing countries need not lose out from farm support cuts abroad. If,
for example, they are close to self-sufficient in food without price supports (as are many
net food-importing countries in Asia and SSA), and reform abroad raises the
international price of food, they may switch to become sufficiently export-oriented that
their net national economic welfare rises. A second possibility is that the developing
country’s own policies are sufficiently biased against food production that the country is
a net importer, despite having a comparative advantage in food. In that case, it has been
shown that the international price rise can improve national economic welfare, even if
the price change is not sufficient to turn that distorted economy into a net food exporter
(Anderson and Tyers 1993). That comes about because the higher price of food attracts
mobile resources away from more-distorted sectors, thereby improving the efficiency of
national resource allocation. Because of these two possibilities, the number of poor
countries for whom a rise in international food prices might cause some hardship is
much smaller than the number that are currently not net exporters of agricultural
products.
What about those developing countries whose comparative advantage is gradually
moving from primary products to (initially unskilled) labour-intensive manufactures, as
in South Asia? While that industrialization lowers their direct interest in agricultural
trade reform abroad, it heightens their keenness to see barriers to exports of textiles and
                                                
10 This and other estimates of gains from preferential market access provisions need to be discounted to
the extent that rules of origin, sanitary and phytosanitary barriers, anti-dumping duties and the like
limit the actual trade allowed. For a detailed analysis of these types of restrictions on EU imports from
Bangladesh in recent years, see UNCTAD/Commonwealth Secretariat (2001, Chapter 5).
11 The impact outside the LDC group would be far from trivial for Mauritius, however, since the vast
bulk of its exports are quota-restricted sales of clothing and sugar to the EU and US. See the
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clothing lowered. That interest of theirs in textile trade expansion should be shared by
agricultural-exporting developing countries, for if South Asia could export more
manufactures, it would tend to become a larger net importer of agricultural products.
Conversely, lowered industrial-country barriers to agricultural trade would reduce the
need for the more land-abundant developing countries to move into manufactures in
competition with the newly industrializing ones. Scope clearly exists for the two groups
to band together and negotiate as a single voice calling for barriers to both farm and
textile trade to be lowered, so that each group can better exploit its comparative
advantage to the direct benefit of the vast majority of poor people in both.
Isn’t China an example where trade reform will add to poverty via lower domestic
prices for farm products?
Because China’s accession to WTO involves a decline in the domestic price of some
farm products, and because farm households in China are among the country’s poorest,
that trade reform is often pointed to as an example of one that will exacerbate poverty.
To explore that possibility, a set of empirical studies was commissioned recently by the
World Bank. The GTAP model was used to generate the changes in product and factor
prices expected from the commitments to reform that China made in its WTO accession
negotiations. These were then mapped to the earning and spending patterns of various
household types and regions in China as revealed in China’s rural and urban household
surveys. The results suggest that the conventional wisdom – that China’s WTO
accession will impoverish its rural people via greater import competition in its
agricultural markets – need not prevail. One needs to keep in mind that, even if prices of
some (land-intensive) farm products fall, those for other (labour-intensive) farm
products could rise. Also, the removal of restrictions on China’s exports of textiles and
clothing will boost town and village enterprises, so demand for non-farm workers in
rural areas may grow even if demand for farm labour in aggregate falls.
New estimates of the likely changes in agricultural prices as a result of WTO accession
are drawn on to examine the factor reward implication of China’s WTO accession
empirically using the GTAP model. Results reported in Anderson et al. (2002) suggest
farm-nonfarm and Western-Eastern income inequality may well rise but rural-urban
income inequality need not. That conclusion is supported by a more-detailed study of
households by Chen and Ravallion (2002). They find negligible impacts on inequality
and a small reduction in poverty in aggregate, but some variance across households and
regions. Farm households tend to lose, especially those highly dependent on feed grain
production (in Northeastern China) and in hinterland regions with weak links to the
booming non-farm sectors and eastern provinces. But the losses are at most very small,
amounting to less than 5 per cent of household income. Facilitating the transfer of some
labour from less-lucrative farm activities to now-more-lucrative non-farm work could
(with the usual remittances back to the farm household) be sufficient to ensure all gain
from China’s WTO accession.
The study by Anderson et al. (2002) also examines how much difference it could make
if the hukou system that restricts rural-to-urban migration were to be abolished. Their
results suggest that the sign of the effects could be switched to favour the poorer farm
households – albeit at the expense of the richer non-farm ones – if the remaining WTO
accession-related reforms were to be accompanied by reform of the hukou system that17
allowed some members of those households to obtain higher-paying non-farm
employment and repatriate earnings back to their farm family. And of course aggregate
national economic welfare would be enhanced by that labour market reform as well.
This illustrates the general point that gains from trade reform will be greater, the more
liberal are domestic product and factor markets.
A summary of those modelling results can be seen in Table 6. Without labour market
reform, WTO accession for China would slightly reduce rewards to unskilled farm
labour and to agricultural land while raising rewards to all other factors of production.
That suggests farm households earning less than 60 per cent of their income from
unskilled nonfarm work could be harmed (albeit only slightly) from WTO accession. If
complete abolition of restrictions to off-farm migration accompanied WTO accession
reforms, however, the final column of Table 6 suggests all types of farm households
could be better off as more family members are attracted to higher-paying off-farm
work.
In so far as China’s WTO accession puts upward pressure on international farm product
prices, that would have the same pro-poor consequences in other developing countries
as the multilateral farm trade reform discussed above. However, the extent of that price
rise and the associated increase in China’s imports of farm products is going to be
minor, and certainly will not, as implied by the title of Lester Brown’s 1995 book,
‘starve the world’ (see the empirical results in Anderson et al. 1997a,b).
Wouldn’t poverty and food insecurity increase in low-income countries because of
higher international food prices?
The impact of trade liberalization on income distribution and thereby on poverty is not
always clear: even though the effects of trade policies on capital owners and workers
have been studied by trade theorists for centuries, applying that theory to the real world
turns out to be a complex empirical task (Winters 2000; McCulloch et al. 2001;
Hoekman et al. 2002). This is because the economy-wide effects depend (a) on the
shares of households’ income from different productive factors such as labour and land,
whose prices will have changed (depending on the size of the changes in relative
producer prices, factor substitutability, factor intensities, and factor mobility between
sectors), (b) on their expenditure shares on different products (whose consumer prices
also will have changed and not necessarily to the same extent as producer prices not
least because of marketing margins), and (c) on any changes in net transfers to them (for
example, increased handouts, decreased taxation, more remitances from urban
relatives). Those complexities make it difficult to generalize a priori, or even in the face
of empirical modelling studies when they report effects of reform just on production,
trade, prices and aggregate economic welfare. Even so, some observations are
nonetheless worth making about the effects on poverty and food security of reducing
agricultural protectionism globally.
Most low-income countries in SSA have not propped up the producer price of food. In
so far as an international food price rise is transmitted domestically, the vast majority of
the poor would benefit directly. This is because they are in farm households and are net
sellers of food. Even poor landless farm labourers who are net buyers of food would
benefit indirectly from agricultural trade liberalization via a rise in the demand for their18
Table 6
Changes in China’s real factor prices and national economic welfare due to its WTO accession,




case plus also removing
labour market distortion
Factor rewards
Farm unskilled wages -0.7 16.8
Rental price of land -5.5 -9.7
Nonfarm unskilled wages 1.2 -3.8
Skilled labour wages 0.8 -1.7
Rental price of capital 1.3 -1.4
Farm household income*
Farm household type-A -1.6 6.8
Farm household type-B -0.8 3.6
Farm household type-C 0.1 0.4
Note: * Farm income from agriculture is made up of 57 per cent from unskilled farm labour, 26 per cent
from agricultural land and 17 per cent from farm capital, according to the GTAP database. In
1999 on average 51 per cent of rural household income in China was earned outside agriculture,
mostly from unskilled labour. Therefore, to illustrate the importance of those off-farm earnings for
farm families, three types of farm households are shown in this table: it is assumed nonfarm
unskilled labour contributes 0 per cent of total farm household income for type A, 30 per cent for
type B, and 60 per cent for type C.
Source: Anderson et al. (2002).
unskilled labour, assuming that raises their wage sufficient to more than offset the rise
in food prices. Since the more affluent people in cities would find it relatively easy to
pay a little extra for food, the only other major vulnerable group is the under-employed
urban poor. But even they may not be worse off because the trade reform would be
likely to generate a more-than-offsetting increase in the demand for their (often informal
sector) services.
What about the impact of reform on food price variability and other aspects of food
security, especially as it affects the poorest households? Contrary to popular belief,
trade liberalization is much more likely to reduce than raise food insecurity for the vast
majority of the world’s poor. Food security means always having access to the
minimum supply of basic food necessary for survival. The key to that, in addition to
peace and greater efficiency in the functioning of staple food markets, is strengthened19
purchasing power of the poor. That is, enhancing food security is mainly about
alleviating poverty. The rate of food self-sufficiency is at most only a supplementary
indicator, and only while there remains a perception that food insecurity rises when the
level of food self-sufficiency in basic foods falls much below 100 per cent.12
Eliminating all agricultural policy distortions in developed countries would raise
international prices for agricultural products on average, and reduce their variance by
‘thickening’ the market, which would stimulate production in non-protected countries.
According to one recent study (Diao et al. 2001), that would boost the value of
agricultural exports of developing countries by 24 per cent while dampening their
agricultural imports by just 2 per cent. That suggests food self-sufficiency in many low-
income countries would rise. As well, since a high proportion of the poorest households
in developing countries are producers and net sellers of food, they would benefit from
such reform. In both respects, therefore, food security for the vast majority of
households in low-income countries should be enhanced on average. Those same
households would be helped even further if agricultural price-depressing policies were
in place domestically and these are removed. The latter reform also boosts self-
sufficiency in agricultural products and thereby boosts even further perceived food
security in those economies.
The Diao et al. (2001) study estimates that eliminating developing countries’ own
agricultural price distortions would boost their farm export value by a further 6 per cent.
True, the households that are net buyers of food in such economies will face higher food
prices; but whether they become less food secure depends also on what happens to their
earnings (and/or transfers). If they are landless rural poor, their earning prospects will
have risen along with the growth in demand for farm labour. As for urban households,
the vast majority of them are more affluent than those in rural households and so can
well afford to pay higher market prices for food. This suggests only a small proportion
of households in low-income economies would be net food buyers at risk of becoming
more food-insecure as a result of rising domestic food prices following trade
liberalization.
What about in low-income economies where agricultural trade liberalization means
lower domestic prices for agricultural products because such countries that have kept
domestic food prices above international levels via import restrictions? It is true that
removing those distortions will reduce farm incomes in those countries (albeit by more
for larger than smaller farms). Certainly urban households will benefit from lower food
prices. However, food self-sufficiency will fall – and it is the fall in both farm earnings
and food self-sufficiency that focuses the attention of those who argue that agricultural
trade liberalization is bad for poor farm households.
Focusing on just the direct effects of agricultural trade policy reform can be misleading,
however, not least because it does not take account of the fact that such reform is
typically done in the context of multilateral, economy-wide liberalization. Being
multilateral means that other countries’ farm protection cuts raise international food
prices and so less of a price fall occurs than when a country cuts it agricultural
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protection unilaterally. And being economy-wide means the decline in demand for farm
labour is more or less than offset by a growth in demand for labour in expanding non-
farm industries.
In short, at least two points are worth stressing. First, eliminating agricultural policy
distortions in developed countries would increase the mean and decrease the variance of
international prices for agricultural products, which would stimulate production in other
countries. That suggests food self-sufficiency would rise in those low-income countries
that transmit international prices to their domestic market. Second, since a high
proportion of the poorest households in low-income countries are producers and net
sellers of food, they would be key beneficiaries of such reform. In both respects,
therefore, food security for the vast majority of households in low-income countries
should be enhanced on average. Those same households would be helped even further if
they had been subject to price-depressing domestic policies and these were removed.
The latter reform also boosts self-sufficiency in agricultural products and thereby boosts
perceived food security even further in those economies. The households that are net
buyers of food in such economies would face higher food prices, but whether they
become less food secure depends also on what happens to their earnings (and/or
transfers). If they are landless rural poor, their earning prospects will have risen along
with the growth in demand for farm labour. As for urban households, the vast majority
of them are more affluent than those in rural households and so can well afford to pay
higher market prices for food. This suggests only a small proportion of households in
low-income economies would be net food buyers at risk of becoming more food-
insecure as a result of rising domestic food prices following trade liberalization.
The risk of re-instrumentation of agricultural protection
If reducing agricultural protection/increasing market access in rich countries is able to
contribute to poverty alleviation in developing countries, then that objective will be
compromised by efforts to substitute new forms of protection as traditional protective
instruments are phased out. The imposition of tariff rate quotas accompanied by very
high out-of-quota tariffs, and the administration of quotas so as to ensure less than full
usage of them, are two ways in which agricultural protection changes following the
Uruguay Round were minimized. As a result, many developing countries are struggling
to identify any significant growth in agricultural export earnings resulting from the
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (Mathews 2002).
There are at least two ways in which cuts may be minimized following the Doha Round
too. One is via an expansion of exempt support measures to satisfy so-called non-trade
concerns related to the alleged ‘multifunctionality’ of agriculture – even though those
concerns can readily be met much more directly and hence in less trade-distorting ways
than is being proposed (Anderson 2000; Paarlberg et al. 2002). While the proposal
originated in the richest, most-protective economies, it is now being embraced by
farmer groups in numerous developing countries as well. More than twenty such
countries’ farm groups plus the EU met in Geneva 23-25 October 2002 and signed a
declaration calling on WTO members to acknowledge that ‘agriculture cannot be treated
in the same way as industrial sectors’ because farming ‘fulfils a multitude of functions’.21
The other is via the adoption of stricter standards that then act as technical barriers to
trade. Quarantine measures are an obvious case in point. They often add relatively large
cost burdens to exporters from poorer countries because those countries do not have the
same capability as developed countries to meet high standards (Wilson 2002).
Numerous developing countries have cited examples of SPS measures of OECD
countries that are already significantly hindering their exports (Mathews 2002). Another
is the increasing use of geographical indications and traditional expressions aimed at
differentiating rich-country products, which effectively reduces the demand for
substitute products from other countries. A less obvious possibility is the restriction of
imports of food products containing genetically modified organisms (GMOs). The
direct short-term effects of a ban on GMOs could help exports from developing
countries that choose not to adopt GMOs even though it harms those who have already
adopted GMOs (Nielsen and Anderson 2001; Anderson and Yao 2004). But the indirect,
longer-term, and potentially much larger effects are adverse for the world’s poor,
namely, the disincentive effect of such restrictions on investment in agricultural
biotechnologies that could lower food prices and/or raise the nutritional attributes of
foods available in developing countries.
Conclusions and policy implications
Low-income countries have much to gain from the WTO’s Doha Round of trade
negotiations. In particular, they have a strong vested interest in working together to push
simultaneously for the freeing up of trade in both farm and textile products.13 Achieving
that end will require some opening up of developing economies themselves as a quid
pro quo, but that will benefit rather than hurt the poor in their own economies –
especially if it includes reducing the relatively high levels of protection currently
afforded many capital-intensive manufacturing industries and the service sector. And it
will be politically easier to do in agriculture the more developed countries reform their
farm policies and thereby raise the mean and lower the variance of international food
prices.
Nonetheless, in some African countries at least, preparedness to move further down the
reform path would be greater if mechanisms were introduced that increased perceived
food security. How a country attains its optimal level of food security is a moot point. If
a society would feel too food-insecure under laissez faire, bearing in mind the above
considerations, then what needs to be determined is a sense of (a) its willingness to pay
for more security by various means, and (b) the costs of those insurance measures. One
such measure involves encouraging the holding of food stocks above those that would
be commercially viable – a public good that is explicitly allowed for in Annex 2 of the
WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture. The optimal level of encouragement is that which
boosts stocks so that the marginal social benefit in terms of food security equals the
marginal social cost of that intervention. Costs are non-trivial, however. Storage and
interest costs and the costs of spoilage and quality deterioration can amount to more
than 20 per cent a year. The cost part of the calculation also would need to include the
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the Cairns Group of non-subsidizing agricultural-exporting countries (Bjornskov and Lind 2002). See
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risk of government failure if stocks were to be managed by an inefficient (or corrupt)
public agency.
If greater domestic production capability was considered by society to be one of the
desirable means of boosting food security (because of a perception that food import
dependence is too unreliable), there are far less costly ways of achieving that than via
protection from food imports. For example, boosting production alone, rather than also
taxing consumption as with an import barrier, would be a lower-cost and less-trade-
distortive means of achieving that end. Even more effective could be improvements in
land tenure and more investment in the stocks of primary factors used in food
production: agricultural research,14 rural human capital, and rural infrastructure (Otsuka
2002). That would provide an especially high payoff in situations where, as in so many
countries, there has been gross under-investment in these activities in the past.
Simultaneously, production could be boosted in many low-income countries simply by
better clarifying and enforcing land rights, since they are a key source of collateral for
securing loans for productive investments by farm households.
Where targeted programmes to boost the earning capacity of the poverty-stricken (for
example, via basic education/training) are still not enough to boost their food security in
the short term, targeted consumer subsidies to provide that core group with food staples
are much less costly than general subsidies to all food consumers via price-depressing
agricultural policies. Food aid that is targeted to just that group could be readily
provided by the international community without depressing very much the prices
received by farmers in recipient countries.15 And greater technical and economic
cooperation in the areas of agricultural research, rural education and health, and rural
infrastructure may be important co-requisites of trade policy reform if developing
countries are to be convinced that they would gain unequivocally from the Doha round.
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